Iran-Israel Dispute Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Program Using Theory Game

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Ph.D. student of international relations, Rafsanjan unit, Islamic Azad University, Rafsanjan, Iran

2 Assistant Prof. in Rafsanjan branch, Islamic Azad University, Rafsanjan, Iran

Abstract

This study aims to examine and analyze the current state of Iran-Israel conflict over Iran's nuclear program. In this regard, the game theory tool has been used. The present research is descriptive-analytical in terms of its purpose and in terms of the nature of the research.
According to the statements of the leader of the revolution that it is impossible to retreat from the nuclear positions and to continue the path that has been made in Iran's nuclear program, one can conclude that all the states of exit and development, rather than maintaining the status quo and maintaining the status quo Preferring to adherence to non-development, as well as adherence to development and non-development, is preferable to military confrontation. On the other hand, Israel's overall strategy is to prevent the development and shutdown of all Iranian nuclear activities, even at the expense of war (limited or global). Also, the results of this study showed that the game at the point is temporarily stopped and, as a result of the theory of games, the state is the point of equilibrium of the game, this includes Iran's withdrawal from the nuclear program and the development without limitation of the nuclear program, and support the increase of all-round pressures And unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions combined with a limited military strike on Israeli nuclear and military installations.

Keywords

References

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Weisser, A. D. (2016). Israel and Iran: Past, present and future (Doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University).‏

Defensive Future Studies
Volume 4, Issue 13
September 2019
Pages 7-39

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